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1. INTRODUCTION. – The result of the referendum held in the United Kingdom 
on 23 June 2016 on the country’s future membership of the European Union produced a narrow 
majority in favour of “Leave” (51.9%) over “Remain” (48.1%). This result confounded 
pollsters’ predictions (which had been for a “Remain” victory, albeit by a relatively small 
margin), and came as a surprise even to the leading voices of the “Brexit” (standing for “British 
exit”) campaign. Given the momentous nature of this decision, reversing more than four 
decades of the UK’s close association with the EU, an enormous and wide-ranging debate has 
ensued. This debate has taken place – and is still ongoing – at multiple levels: in politics (most 
obviously in the tortuous negotiations with the EU which still have much to resolve), in the 
media, in academia, and in all manner of conversations which take place on an everyday basis 
throughout the country. 
If the referendum result was a surprise for the majority of the British population, it was 
even more shocking for the 3.2 million EU migrants living in the UK at the time. As part of a 
discourse about “uncontrolled immigration” from the EU which was at the heart of the “Leave” 
campaign, these migrants were central to the Brexit debate yet they were politically voiceless 
as they could not vote in the referendum (1). In this article, we chronicle the impact of Brexit 
on one “typical” group of young EU migrants in Britain – Italians (Ricucci, 2017). The research 
material for this paper derives from a Horizon 2020 project called YMOBILITY (“Youth 
Mobility: Maximising Opportunities for Individuals, Labour Markets and Regions in Europe”), 
details of which will be elaborated later.  
The article is organised as follows. In the next section we say more about Brexit, 
building on the recent paper in this journal by Picascia et al. (2016) and on other key literature 
from geography, sociology and politics (especially Lulle et al., 2018; Morgan, 2017; Outhwaite, 
2016). We connect this analysis to studies on Italian emigration in recent years pursued by 
several scholars (Bonifazi and Livi Bacci, 2014; Gjergji, 2015; Sanfilippo, 2017; Tirabassi and 
del Prá, 2014). We resist a full diagnosis of the Brexit “event”, since this would lead us away 
from the main theme of this paper, which is the views and reactions of a sample of young 
Italians interviewed in the London region before and after the June 2016 referendum.  
The subsequent two sections of the paper describe the wider YMOBILITY research 
project, and the methods used to elicit young-adult Italians’ perceptions and experiences of 
Brexit. As the title of the paper indicates, we focus on two main dimensions emerging from the 
                                                          
∗ This article is based on a presentation made by the authors to the session “Negotiating Brexit: migrants’ 
spatialities and identities in a changing Europe”, Annual Conference of the Royal Geographical Society, London, 
29 August to 1 September 2017. 
1 Exceptions being UK-resident Irish citizens who, ever since Irish independence, have had full voting rights and 
the rights to come and go, and to work in the UK, as well as UK-resident citizens of Malta and Cyprus because of 
their membership of the Commonwealth. 
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interview narratives collected: the respondents’ feelings during the making of the Brexit 
campaign and in the aftermath of the referendum, and the impact they thought it would have 
on their plans for the future. 
In synthesis, our findings show that Brexit triggered a resentful and angry reaction 
amongst Italian migrants, who felt betrayed by the result. Moreover, the vote marked a shift in 
their self-perception, and in their awareness of the shift in the way they were perceived within 
the immigration landscape of the UK. Before Brexit, as “old” EU immigrants (i.e. from the 
Western European countries which were early members of the EU), Italians – like the French, 
Germans, Dutch etc. – had enjoyed a status of relative invisibility (Favell, 2008). After Brexit, 
our interviewees started to feel, and be made to feel, more visible and targeted as “unwelcome”. 
In an attempt to respond to the increasing stigmatisation of EU migrants apparently legitimised 
by the Brexit result, they employed a number of rhetorical strategies (Moroşanu and Fox, 2013; 
Ricucci, 2017), including emphasising their “rights to belong” but also distinguishing 
themselves from “other” EU migrants from the “Eastern” countries whom they associated with 
negative stereotypes and who they blamed for the anti-immigrant backlash which stoked the 
Brexit movement. Concerning their plans for the future, Brexit has not (yet) changed their 
perspectives fundamentally. This is because, at the time of writing, two years on from the 
referendum, the precise nature of their rights to stay in Britain, and what they have to do to 
secure those rights, are still not transparently clear. In some cases, intentions to settle longer-
term are put on hold pending further clarity in the outcome of the Brussels negotiations; in 
other cases planned moves, e.g. to return, are accelerated. Gallo and Staniscia (2016, 358) note 
that the young Italians are “born European, with a sense of European identity and previous 
experiences abroad” and this is exactly what allows their vision of the future as open. This 
openness to return to Italy or to move to another country (see also Zurla, 2014) was indeed 
identified in our sample too. 
 
2. BREXIT: AN EVENT OF “RUPTURE”. – We see Brexit as a moment of 
“rupture”, both in Britain’s geopolitical positionality within Europe and, more pointedly, given 
the aims of this paper, in the lives of EU migrants present within the UK (2). It has produced 
an outpouring of political, media and public debate ranging from extreme consternation and 
expressions of economic doom to jingoistic statements of national pride and self-righteousness. 
Just two examples to illustrate the extremes. On a recent visit to London to mark the opening 
of the new European headquarters of his media empire, former New York mayor Michael 
Bloomberg opined that “Brexit is the single stupidest thing a country has ever done to itself… 
apart from the election of Donald Trump as US president” (3). Contrast this iconic quote with 
the celebratory remarks over the planned restoration of the traditional dark blue British passport, 
which prime minister Theresa May lauded as “an expression of our independence and 
sovereignty” (4). 
                                                          
2 Also affected are the lives and rights of the estimated 1.2 million British citizens living in the EU. Like EU 
migrants in Britain, they are a heterogenous population, although the largest socio-demographic group are 
retirement migrants living in Spain. This population is not our concern in this paper, although the ongoing Brexit 
negotiations have linked the outcome of their rights and futures with those of EU migrants in Britain. 
3 This speech was widely reported, for instance in The Guardian, 24 October 2017; The Independent, 24 October 
2017; Politico, 26 October 2017. Bloomberg also reflected on the question: “Would I have done it [made the £1 
billion investment in London] if I knew they were going to drop out [of Europe]? Maybe I wouldn’t have…” 
4 As reported in The Observer, 24 December 2017. This move was criticised even from within the Conservative 
Party, for instance by Charles Powell, former aide to Margaret Thatcher, who said the clamour for the old-style 
document was “part of the nostalgia on which the predominantly elderly Brexit constituency thrives”. 
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For the sake of completeness, we now sketch in some background information. Britain 
joined the EU, or the European Economic Community as it then was, in 1973 in the 
Community’s first enlargement, along with Ireland and Denmark. Although the UK was 
cautious about the next, southward enlargement of the EU in the 1980s, fearing large inflows 
of immigrants from the poorer economies of Greece, Spain and Portugal (flows which did not 
materialise), it was a leading voice in favour of the eastward expansion of the EU, partly 
because a geographical widening of the EU would counterbalance any trend of deepening 
political integration, which Britain was opposed to. Thus the 2016 referendum brusquely 
interrupted a long process, lasting over four decades, of the “Europeanisation” of the UK. 
Geopolitically, Britain’s progressive European orientation compensated for its declining 
influence in the rest of the world through the loss of its colonial empire in the early postwar 
decades; although in other respects – language, education, culture etc. – its postcolonial 
influence remained strong.  
However, the referendum did not happen in a vacuum. On the contrary, some signs of 
an increasing securitisation and an emerging xenophobic climate in Europe and beyond had 
already appeared in 2014 with the Swiss referendum “against mass immigration” – arguably 
the European political event closest to Brexit. On the 9th February 2014, 50.3% of the national 
population approved the proposal launched by the national conservative Swiss People’s Party 
of reducing immigration through a partial restriction on the free movement agreed in the 2002 
treaty between Switzerland and the EU. More recently, further evidence of the anti-immigrant, 
neo-nationalist turn in European politics was seen in recent general elections in Italy, 4th March 
2018, and Hungary, 8th April 2018. 
Shifting back to the UK, the two main British political parties have always been divided 
over Europe. The right wing of the “Tory” (Conservative) Party has traditionally been 
“Eurosceptic”, holding on to an outdated, colonialist view of Britain’s position in the world, 
whilst the left wing of the Labour Party has periodically been opposed to the EU, which it sees 
as a front for free-market economics and corporate capitalism. Meanwhile the sudden rise of 
the UK Independence Party (UKIP), steered by its outspoken leader Nigel Farage, gained 
traction as a one-issue party – the mission of leaving the EU. In order to placate the Eurosceptic 
Tories, and fearful of the corrosive potential of UKIP to capture votes over the twin themes of 
Europe and immigration, prime minister David Cameron rashly made an election pledge to 
hold a referendum on EU membership. The plan backfired, Cameron resigned, and Theresa 
May emerged as prime minister after an extraordinary mise en scene in which the leading 
candidate Boris Johnston was metaphorically knifed in the back by his rival Michael Gove, a 
political act which also destroyed the latter’s credibility as leader. 
After this brief review of the political background to the referendum, how can we 
explain its outcome? Picascia et al. (2016) present several diagnostic correlations which we 
can use to explore some of the reasons for the unexpected result. The strongest correlation (r = 
0.86) is that between the “Remain” vote share and the percentage of graduates in each electoral 
district (n = 382). Almost as strong is the inverse relationship: between the percentage vote for 
“Leave” and the share of the population with no academic or professional qualifications (r = 
0.76). Other correlations produced by Picascia et al. are less strong and need to be evaluated in 
a more nuanced way. The variable of “age” (older voters more likely to vote “Leave”, younger 
voters for “Remain”) is partly explained by its autocorrelation with education, and it also varies 




Hence we see that geography is vital for interpreting Brexit (Morgan, 2017). At the 
level of the UK’s constituent “nations”, England and Wales voted in favour of Brexit; Scotland 
and Northern Ireland wanted to stay in the EU. In terms of the urban-rural divide, cosmopolitan 
London, some other metropolitan areas in England, Wales (Cardiff, Leeds, Leicester, Bristol), 
and smaller university cities (Oxford, Cambridge, York, Exeter, Brighton etc.) voted “Remain”; 
older and smaller industrial cities, especially these in Northern and Eastern England, voted 
“Leave”. Some of the highest rates of “Leave” voting were in traditional working-class Labour 
strongholds where high rates of unemployment and social deprivation caused a wave of 
populist alienation and protest against the political class (Calhoun, 2016; Hearn, 2016). The 
EU and especially immigration were seen as somehow “responsible” for this malaise, a process 
of scapegoating fomented by UKIP propaganda and the right-wing tabloid press (Bhambra, 
2016). In other areas, on the other hand, a high percentage of foreign-born residents correlated 
with higher votes for the “Remain” camp (5). This included the cases of Brighton and London, 
where the field research for this paper was done. 
  
3. “YMOBILITY”. – Material for this paper was collected as part of the UK’s 
participation in the H2020 YMOBILITY project, which involves a comprehensive and multi-
method programme of research exploring issues relating to young people’s migration within 
the EU. The project runs for three years 2015-2018 and is coordinated by the University of 
Rome “La Sapienza”: see www.ymobility.eu. for full details. The research consortium covers 
nine partner-countries: three are countries predominantly of youth immigration (the UK, 
Germany, Sweden), three are countries mainly of youth emigration (Latvia, Slovakia, 
Romania), and three (Italy, Spain, Ireland) have a combination of inflows and outflows of 
young migrants, partly related to the impact of the post-2008 economic crisis.  
For the qualitative interview part of the YMOBILITY programme of research, the age 
criteria were that participants should have migrated to the UK between the ages of 18 and 35 
years and be no older than 39 at the time of the interview survey, which was carried out between 
late 2015 and early 2017 (6). Interviews were administered in the London region which, for 
our purposes, includes not only the metropolis itself but also a wider area functionally linked 
to the capital by daily commuting. The research considers three categories of migrant: students 
(including doctoral researchers), highly skilled workers (mainly graduate-level professionals 
and those with intermediate socio-occupational status), and lower-skilled workers (unskilled, 
semi-skilled or skilled manual and service workers) without higher-level qualifications (7). 
One of the key objectives of YMOBILITY has been to investigate, via a total of 820 
in-depth interviews carried out across the nine countries, the reasons why young people move, 
                                                          
5 The relationship between presence of migrants and referendum voting trends varies geographically. The highest 
“Leave” votes were recorded in Eastern towns where there had been a rapid growth in the presence of Polish and 
other East European agricultural and food industry workers since 2004. By contrast, some high-immigration cities 
such as London, Leicester and Leeds voted “Remain”. Picascia et al. (2016, p. 625) calculated an overall negative 
correlation of -0.30 for the relationship between percent foreign-born and voting “Leave”. 
6 The age definitions are not unproblematic but are used to set the broad parameters of the migrant population 
under investigation. We, and the YMOBILITY project at large, recognise that “youth” is an extremely flexible 
notion and that life-stage, especially in an age where the transition from “youth” to “full adulthood” is often 
delayed and subject to stasis and even reversals (see Worth, 2009). 
7 The matching of education level with skill level in the labour market is potentially problematic too, especially 
when young migrants face language barriers and migrate across sharp economic and wage gradients. Thus it is 
common for highly educated migrants from the post-2004 and post-2007 “accession” countries like Poland and 
Romania to accept low-skilled jobs in the “West”. 
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the channels through which they do so (the education system, the labour market, family and 
friendship networks), the nature of their experiences in terms of material and emotional 
wellbeing (career progress, personal development, identity etc.), and spatial and temporal 
perspectives on the future – do they intend to stay in their chosen host country or do they plan 
to return-migrate to their origin country or to onward-migrate to another European or, possibly, 
non-European country? In the migrant-sending countries, quota-samples of return-migrants 
were also interviewed. 
For the UK, 120 interviews were collected from six nationalities of migrants: 20 each 
from Italy, Spain, Ireland, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania. According to the time-line of the 
overall project, these interviews were programmed for the period September 2015 to May 2016. 
One of the obvious dangers of primary research is that data collection becomes a victim of its 
own timing. So it was with this research, as the unexpected Brexit result threw up into the air 
some of the findings of the interviews, as well as disrupting the migrant-lives of the 
interviewees, many of whom, as we shall see, entered an existential crisis with the “Brexit 
moment”. Accordingly, we decided to re-interview, post-Brexit, a share of the original 
interviewees.  
Our article aims at providing an overview of young Italian migrants’ perceptions on 
Brexit. The project was conducted using exclusively qualitative methods. Therefore, more than 
providing an analysis on how Brexit changed Italian migrants' migration plans, our objective 
is to explore the informants’ feelings during the making of the Brexit campaign and following 
the outcome of the referendum. Our hypothesis was that the strong sentiments and reactions 
provoked by this crucial event would also reflect on the participants’ plans for the future. 
 
4. METHODS. – For this paper we draw on the narrative contents of 35 interviews 
with 28 Italian migrants who were living and either working or studying in the wider London 
region. The main location for interviews outside of London was Brighton, which is less than 
an hour by train from the capital. We need to bear in mind this regional specificity, especially 
in the context of Brexit, for much of London, and even more so Brighton, voted in favour of 
“Remain”, as noted above. 
As part of the main YMOBILITY interview survey, 20 young-adult Italians were 
interviewed in the London region during late 2015 and early 2016. These interviews covered a 
rather full range of topics relating to the participants’ life-histories, migration trajectories, and 
experiences in the UK. Those interviews administered in 2016, when the date of the referendum 
was already known (it was announced in February), included some reference at the end of the 
interview schedule about the possible outcome of the vote, but since at that stage it was widely 
anticipated that Britain would vote to stay in the EU, this question generated scarce data. 
On average, these first-round interviews lasted about one hour. They were set up and 
digitally recorded subject to the participants’ approval under the principle of “informed 
consent”. The sample was equally divided by gender and, reflecting what was understood from 
other literature about the social and educational status of recent young Italian migrants in the 
UK (Colpi, 2017; Conti, 2012; King et al., 2016; Scotto 2015), contained more graduate-
educated workers (10) than lower-educated (5) or students (5). The non-student interviewees 
worked in a variety of occupations including chef, waiter, architect, accountant, and 
postdoctoral researcher. The participants’ geographical origin was evenly distributed in the 
Italian peninsula, both in terms of the North/South divide and in relation to big cities or small 
towns. Several scholars (Banifazi and Livi Bacci, 2014; Caneva, 2016; Gallo and Staniscia, 
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2016; Montanari and Staniscia, 2017) point out how Italian emigration in recent years has 
actually changed from the traditional paradigm which framed the Southern underdeveloped 
areas as the main location of outward migration. On the contrary, even areas that were 
prosperous prior to the 2007–2008 economic crisis (mainly the Northern regions) have become 
territories of emigration. 
When we contacted the first-wave participants for a second interview post-Brexit, eight 
agreed and were duly interviewed again; the remaining 12 had either already left the UK, did 
not reply, or declined a second interview. In order to counteract this somewhat disappointing 
result, another seven new respondents were added. Like the initial interviewees, these were 
approached via a variety of methods, including the authors’ personal friendship and contact 
networks, Facebook groups, and snowball sampling. Like the initial wave of interviews, these 
second-wave interviews must be regarded as a “convenience sample”, useful for identifying 
trends and reactions to the “event” of Brexit but not a statistically representative sample. For 
these new interviewees, the same ethical guidelines were used to ensure informed consent and 
permission to record and transcribe. Given that long first interviews had already taken place, 
the re-interviews were focused solely on questions relating to Brexit, and hence were fairly 
short, 20-30 minutes on average. For the new post-Brexit interviews, some background 
biographical and migration questions had to be covered before the Brexit-specific ones. 
Therefore these interviews were of intermediate length: 30-40 minutes. 
Despite attempts to keep the sample distribution broad across the three categories 
(students, higher and lower skilled), an element of respondent self-selection was unavoidable 
in the second-wave, post-Brexit interviews. The “respondent-driven” sample was almost 
entirely made up of higher-skilled and somewhat older migrants, aged 23-36 years old. We 
posit that this socio-demographic profile was more receptive than others to the request for a 
(re)interview because of a greater familiarity with academic research (cf. Staniscia, 2018). 
The post-Brexit interviews were organised around five main questions: 
 
1. Did you expect the result of the referendum? 
2. What was your immediate reaction and how do you interpret the result? 
3. What do you think of the new socio-political situation in Britain? 
4. Has your sense of “home” or “belonging” changed? 
5. Has Brexit changed your plans for the future, for instance about staying shorter or longer 
term, or returning home? 
 
Two final methodological points. All interviews were carried out in Italian, and then 
simultaneously translated and transcribed into English for future comparative analysis (8). 
Second, in the quotes that follow, pseudonyms are used in order to preserve the anonymity of 
the participants. 
After the interview, we kept in informal touch with nearly all the interviewees through 
social media. While, before the interview, Facebook had been used to simply check their 
interest and availability in taking part in the study, after that it became an easy means through 
which to monitor important changes in their life, such as transfers to other countries or simply 
                                                          
8 The first-named author carried out all the interviews and transcriptions, and also produced a preliminary analysis 
for this paper. The second author’s role was to design the project and the interview schedule, to assist with 




their opinions on Brexit-related political events. At the time of writing, all the participants have 
“kept their word” in relation to their future plans (cf. also Zurla, 2014): those who planned to 
move have done it (two of them – a couple – have moved back to Italy and one has moved to 
Edinburgh), those who were not sure on what to do are still evaluating their next move and the 
one participant who envisioned his life in the UK has not changed his mind; on the contrary, 
his partner has recently had a second baby and they are well settled in Britain. 
 
5. FINDINGS. – We organise the results of our analysis of the interview narratives in 
three subsections corresponding to the key themes signalled in the title of this paper: Italian 
immigrants’ initial reaction to Brexit; their subsequent strategies of interpreting and coping 
with the new situation; and their plans for the future. Under each of these broad headings a 
number of narrative subthemes and repeated key-words clearly emerged: shock and horror at 
the result; the “stupidity” of the British electorate; the cynicism and hypocrisy of the pro-Brexit 
politicians (and yet an appreciation of why Britain still feels itself to be “different” from the 
rest of Europe); post-Brexit feelings of betrayal and rejection; a culture of “blame” projected 
towards “East European” immigrants; and continuing uncertainty over what the future holds, 
both politically for Britain within Europe and for themselves as migrants whose security of 
stay has been dislodged by the “Brexit moment” and its lingering aftermath. 
 
5.1 Reactions to the referendum: Brexit as shock and betrayal. – In response to the 
first question, which was about anticipating the Brexit result, nearly all of the interviewees 
thought that “Remain” would win. In doing so, they reflected the general view of the “informed” 
media (in the event not so well informed!) and the poll predictions. Their apparent confidence 
in the “stay” outcome was rooted partly in their own experience of “free movement”, including 
many who had been Erasmus students, and partly in their belief that Brexit would not happen 
“because it seemed so stupid”, prefiguring Michael Bloomberg’s iconoclastic remark quoted 
earlier.  
One exception to the general expectation was Gabriella (age 32), who was combining 
working in a shop in Brighton with doing a part-time PhD. She based her prediction that “Leave” 
would win on a comparison with Italy under Berlusconi and the way that the witty and 
charismatic “Leave” politician Boris Johnston (currently foreign secretary in the May 
government) was known affectionately by his first name, just like “Silvio”. Here is an extended 
extract from her insightful narrative: 
  
“Well, I talked to different people… both English, so people who could vote, and non-
English – people at the university, even customers in the shop. And everyone said 
‘Remain’ would win. For me, being a true pessimist, the feeling that ‘Leave’ would 
win was strong. Obviously not in Brighton but, for example, watching a few debates 
on TV and seeing a few things that I had seen in Italy, what happened with 
Berlusconi… For example, that debate on BBC… I watched just 20 minutes of it and 
then started crying; in those 20 minutes I realised ‘Leave’ would win. Every time that 
Boris spoke he was consulted as a friend, as the one who puts on a good show… while 
instead all the others were called by their surname in a more formal way. Which is 
exactly the same thing they used to do with Berlusconi… calling him Silvio… that’s 




Apart from the sheer surprise element of the referendum result, the other immediate 
reactions were shock and outrage, which quickly developed into a sense of victimhood and 
betrayal. Many participants gave detailed descriptions of their behaviour on the night of the 
referendum; of how they followed the vote count with close attention and mounting anxiety; 
and then, the morning after, sharing the disturbing news with partners, housemates and friends. 
Flavia (29, postdoctoral researcher) described her immediate reaction in the following words: 
 
“I woke up in the morning and… we had a WhatsApp group, and a friend texted us: 
‘Sorry guys, we’re all out!’ And I felt… like shit”. 
 
Like Flavia, many other interviewees used “embodied” terms to refer to their physical reaction 
to the result – “a kick in the stomach”, “a slap in the face” etc. Matteo (23, university student) 
echoed the feelings of many participants when he said he felt that Italians “were not welcome 
anymore” and had started to experience a new and unpleasant sensation of now being “visible”, 
or perhaps we should say “visibilised” by the referendum vote, in contrast to their “invisible” 
status previously (cf. Favell, 2008). Looking back a year or so to the referendum, Gabriella 
said: 
 
 “Those were bad days, very bad days… because you try not to take it personally. You 
think: ‘What have I done to deserve this?’ because it was clearly not a vote against the 
EU, it was a vote against immigrants”. 
 
This shock and disappointment over Brexit was not only reserved for our Italian 
participants, it was also experienced by their fellow EU migrants (Lulle et al., 2018) and shared 
by nearly half the UK population, especially those living in multicultural and cosmopolitan 
cities like London and the major university cities, where strong connections exist to the EU via 
business, student exchanges and staff appointments. As an illustration of this solidarity between 
sections of the UK population and EU migrants, Flavia reported, “My professor burst into tears 
in front of me!” 
 However, other sectors of British society were not so upset, and there has been a sharp 
increase in racist speech and hate crime since the referendum – documented by police statistics 
presented in reputable media sources such as The Independent and Time magazine (see Bulmar, 
2007; John, 2017) (9). This issue was perceived at a general level by all interviewees, some of 
whom had friends, generally living elsewhere in the country, who had been the victims of racist 
slurs and attitudes. And one of the participants – Matteo – had been the target of a violent hate 
crime episode. Late one night, in a park in Brighton, he had been asked for cigarettes by a gang 
of local British teenagers: noticing his foreign accent and the fact that he was “not from here”, 
they beat him up and told him to “go back where you come from”. 
The assault on Matteo was at the extreme end of Brexit-“legitimised” violence against 
Italians and other EU migrants (10), but all participants noticed a “change in the atmosphere” 
after Brexit. They attributed the higher visibility and frequency of aggressive behaviour to a 
tacit acceptance of racist speech and attitudes at the political level. Many of our informants 
                                                          
9 The terrorist attacks in London and Manchester, which coincided with the aftermath of Brexit, yet which were 
politically unconnected with it, probably also contributed to a climate of heightened xenophobia targeting 
immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. 
10 The incidence of racist language and physical attacks against the two largest and most stigmatised “Eastern” 
EU migrant groups in Britain, Poles and Romanians, has been much higher. 
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inscribed Brexit in a wider political framework, drawing parallels with the election of Donald 
Trump as president of the United States in November 2016 and the rising support for far-right 
and nationalist parties across Europe. 
 
5.2  Strategies for dealing with the reality of Brexit. – Once the initial shock had 
been digested, participants reacted by voicing several other narrative themes. One was anger, 
vented not just at those who voted for Brexit, but also at those supporting “Remain” who had 
not been assertive enough. This was often linked to a parallel narrative of self-righteousness, 
contrasting hard-working Italian and EU migrants with feckless locals who criticise migrants 
yet are lazy and live off benefits. Some extracts with the interview with Elisa (35), who came 
to England at the mature age of 32 and now works as a chef in a restaurant, are typical and 
revealing. First she sounds off about those who voted “Remain” but are seemingly in denial: 
 
“… those who excused themselves because their nation behaved like shit… I met a lot 
of those people… I started to defend myself. And my self-defence consisted of ‘You 
say you’re sorry?’ Because this country doesn’t represent you anymore… Honey, I have 
27 countries where to go, I have 27 destinations because I’m still a European citizen, 
I’m still part of Europe. You: where can you go?”  
 
Then, in another angry rant, she remembered an incident when she was told off for speaking 
Italian to a friend by a passer-by in the street: 
 
 “He was one of those guys drinking beer from a can at 5pm, one of the classic ones 
who lives off benefits and criticises immigrants. Let’s be clear: I pay your benefits with 
my NINO [national insurance] and with my taxes. So you cannot tell me anything, 
really! Because immigrants here make a net contribution to the UK’s GDP, a big 
percentage!” 
 
Gabriella reinforced this important narrative theme of “right to stay” because of her 
economic contribution, and the fact that she is not exploiting the UK health system in any way, 
ending her interview extract on a typical note of exasperation which reprises the headline title 
of this paper: 
 
“We work, we study, we pay our taxes; it’s not true that we want your NHS [health 
service] because, if I could, I would fly home every time I have a cold. […] So, the idea 
that I am in a country that I consider European and yet I am seen as an immigrant who 
steals your job, who comes here because this is a wonderful country [cynical tone]… I 
don’t know… and I don’t deserve it just because I wasn’t born here”. 
 
Two other linked narrative tropes emerged as part of the participants’ strategy of dealing 
with, and explaining to themselves, their victimisation as a result of Brexit. These are the notion 
of Italians having a decades- (if not centuries-) long “culture of migration” (Sanfilippo 2017, 
360), and, secondly, a line of argumentation that distinguishes them as “vintage” migrants from 
the post-2004 Eastern European arrivistes. 
 Young Italians today grow up in a country which has both a long history of emigration 
and a contemporary culture of youth migration and mobility (Parati, 2011; see also Horvath, 
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2008; Timmerman et al., 2014). Specifically, Gjergji (2015), Ricucci (2017, 96) and Sanfilippo 
(2017, 367) point out that this tendency of the youth to migrate does not interest high-skilled 
migrants only – as the narrative of “brain-drain” suggests – but “simple talents” too; which we 
found reflected in our informants’ variety of backgrounds. Our interviewees were aware that, 
coming from one of the founder-members of the EU, they have long held the right to be freely 
mobile within Europe, and hence regard themselves as “old” migrants enjoying, until now, 
relative “invisibility” in the UK (Colpi, 2017; Favell, 2008; Ricucci, 2017). Moreover, Ricucci 
(2017) points out that, during her research on young Southern European migrants in London, 
not a single one of her interviewees used the word “migrant” or “immigrant”, thus deliberately 
detaching themselves from this category. The situation of migrants from the more recent 
members of the EU, especially Bulgaria and Romania, which joined in 2007, has been very 
different. Their reception has been characterised by a rather hostile attitude in Britain and other 
receiving countries in Western Europe (Moroșanu, 2012). Romanians, in particular, were often 
singled out for negative and offensive remarks by the far-right wing of the “Leave” campaign. 
In Luciano’s (34) words, the Eastern Europeans, especially the Romanians and the Poles, “are 
the immigrants who really annoy the Brits”. In order to counteract the tendency of the British 
public and media to lump all EU migrants together as part of the problems of what were 
regarded as “excessive numbers of immigrants” and “failing to control our borders”, our Italian 
interviewees deploy discursive strategies to draw their own borders, distinguishing themselves 
as “old, deserving” migrants, and “Eastern Europeans” as the real source of the “problem” of 
immigration thrown up in the background to Brexit. Above all, by stressing their intellectual, 
moral and cultural capital – their university qualifications, command of English and refusal to 
claim benefits – some young Italians construct a social boundary between themselves as “first-
class” immigrants, and the “others” (Eastern Europeans), designated as “second-class” (cf. 
Wimmer, 2008). It was Elisa who gave the most thorough articulation of this “thesis of 
distinction”:  
 
 “We are Italian and we are a certain kind of immigrant, A-rank immigrants. If you talk 
to a Brexit supporter, they are not afraid of Italians or French or Spanish; if you talk to 
someone who voted ‘Leave’ to clean this country… they are people who do not want 
Romanians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks… and Turks!” 
 
She referred to Turks because part of the alarmist rhetoric of the UK Independence Party was 
the spectre of Britain being open to an “invasion” of Turkish migrants coming from a large 
(population 80 Million) and Muslim country which was also host to some 3 million Syrian 
refugees (11) 
 For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to stress that this “A and B rank” division was 
generally presented in a sarcastic tone, as if it were a division commonly established by the 
British mainstream media and society, rather than a classification invented and shared by the 
interviewees. Nevertheless, the fact that this rhetorical device of drawing boundaries was used 
by several interviewees helped them to make sense of their changed position in the context of 
Brexit. Identifying in “others”, namely Eastern Europeans, Turks and Syrian refugees, the 
                                                          
11 As a long-standing associate member of the EU, there is the theoretical possibility of Turkey joining, which has 
been much discussed in EU political circles over the years. Whilst the EU is divided over the putative question of 
Turkey’s accession, it is extremely unlikely given the political complexion of the country’s current authoritarian 
and Islamist government. 
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threat depicted by the “Leave” campaign, they were simultaneously able to re-establish their 
legitimate position within British society (Smith, 1989). 
 
 5.3  Plans for the future. – For a perspective on how young Italian migrants 
perceived that Brexit would affect their plans, we compared their answers between the pre-
Brexit interviews and those carried out post-Brexit. There are three geographical options 
theoretically available: wanting to “stay put”, going back to Italy, or moving to a different EU 
country (or, possibly, to a non-EU country). A fourth option, which actually proved to be 
relevant in several cases for the post-Brexit sample, was indecision or “wait and see”. Gallo 
and Staniscia (2016) envision in this variety of options an open disposition of a generation that 
is “born European” but that has also been harshly hit by the economic crisis that started in 2008. 
 However, when we analyse the interview transcripts in detail, we find that the pre- and 
post-Brexit comparison is less easy to make. Across the entire sample of 35 interviews, most 
respondents did not envision staying permanently in the UK; they found it hard to imagine not 
returning to live in Italy at some point in the future (12). The reasons put forward for this 
perception of the inevitability of return were mostly connected to cultural and family reasons 
– their nostalgia for Italy, the Italian way of life, food, climate etc., and their feelings of 
solidarity and duty, especially towards their parents in the latter’s old age. The emerging 
strength of these bonds was also very revealing in differentiating the informants’ need to move 
(connected to socio-economic reasons) at the origin of their migration from their “desire” to 
move to experience a cosmopolitan and fulfilling lifestyle (Gallo and Staniscia, 2016; Raffini, 
2014; Staniscia, 2018). 
 During the post-Brexit interviews, especially in the (admittedly small) matched 
subsample of re-interviewees, we were able to witness how certain participants had broadly 
kept the same ideas they had before the referendum, although in a few cases these plans had 
been accelerated – for instance, returning home quicker than originally planned. A typical case 
was Roberto (29 at first interview, 30 at the second) who came to England aged 26 in response 
to a job advert. A graduate in geosciences, he had sent his CV to several Italian and 
international engineering companies, and one in Crawley (a mid-sized industrial town south of 
London) had been the first to reply and offer him a job. Yet Roberto had never felt really at 
home in the UK, and already in his pre-Brexit interview he was hinting at being fed up and 
wanting to go back. Part of the background to Roberto’s difficulty of settling was that he had 
only limited experience of travelling outside of his region of Italy before he arrived in England. 
Whilst he appreciated the opportunity to broaden his horizons, improve his knowledge of 
English and earn a good salary (significantly higher than he would have got in Italy), he had 
difficulty adapting to the “English way of life”, especially as he experienced it in Crawley, a 
largely working-class dormitory town. Here are some pithy excerpts from his first interview: 
 
 “I was naïve, I absolutely didn’t know what to expect… I knew they would pay me well, 
and that was it… My job is in Crawley, the shining star of Sussex [said with heavy 
                                                          
12 The very few exceptions usually involved commitments and relationships which were now stronger in the UK. 
For instance Giulio was waiting for his Polish girlfriend to give birth to their first child. Both had permanent jobs 
in London and could not easily envisage relocating to Italy. Our findings, in general, contrast to some extent with 
those of Conti and King (2015), who found a general reluctance amongst their interviewees (all graduates) to 
return from the UK to Italy because of the poor prospects there and their disillusionment with the Italian 
“mentality”, and especially with the practice of “raccomandazione” in the professional and academic job markets. 
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sarcasm]… And I mean, I’m almost 30 and I share a flat with other people… it really 
breaks your balls… to live with other people constantly changing. 
 […] 
 And then Crawley, you know, is not an easy place to live, it’s quite rough [said in 
English], there is no university… You go to work, you go to sleep, and then you go to 
work… that’s it. You can go out on a Friday night but the quality of your night out is 
the same as going out in [names a small boring town near his home city in Italy]… The 
food is crap… the mentality of the people... the weather… and so it’s not so easy. 
 […] 
 Really, my home is in Italy, in [names his home city], no doubt about this!” 
 
 By the time we contacted Roberto for the follow-up interview, he was already back in 
Italy, so the second interview was by Skype. It had been a hasty decision to return, especially 
because he had to give up his well-paid job and his savings had been eroded by the sharp fall 
in the value of sterling against the euro. The “atmosphere” of Brexit had only hastened his 
departure, but did not fundamentally affect his decision to return which, after four years in 
England, had already been made. Like nearly all of our research participants, Roberto had been 
surprised at the way the vote went, but he said he could see the mindset of the “Leave” voters 
in the population of Crawley, who were not able to appreciate the benefits of migration, only 
the threats: 
 
 “The true Crawley people, the English from Crawley, in my opinion, they don’t see 
immigration in a positive way… even if it’s a high-level immigrant… They see him as 
a stranger, a foreigner… as if immigrants steal their jobs”. 
 
The second spatial option – to move to another country – was being considered by half 
of the post-Brexit interviewees, including one (Alessandro, 28) who had already moved to 
Edinburgh; part of his argument being that Scotland voted by a large margin to stay in the EU 
(even if it is, for the time being, legally bound by the overall UK vote for Brexit). However, in 
most of these cases, the decision to “move on” was not dependent solely on Brexit but was 
subordinated to other commitments, above all the next career move. Hence, for Gabriella, 
following the forthcoming completion of her PhD, “my idea… is wherever I find a job 
corresponding to what I want, possibly in Europe”. In the case of Elisa, her future plans were 
related to her business ambitions in the catering sector: 
 
“So, in a year and a half I complete my first five years in the UK. And before Brexit I 
thought to stay here, open my own business, save some money to buy a place instead 
of having to rent… Eh, but now I don’t see the point of it”. 
 
She was considering moving to France as an alternative. But in reality her decision to move to 
a different EU country was not motivated by the actual impossibility of staying and opening a 
business in the UK; rather it could be seen as an act of revenge against a population that 
apparently no longer wants to welcome EU migrants. 
 As for Roberto, if his recently accomplished return to live in his home region in north-
east Italy did not work out, and if his girlfriend, who had followed him back to Italy, was also 




 “We are continental people – that’s it. It has to be near enough to Italy… and it should 
be a country where there are cities that I can visit and the food is good… where I can 
find a social fabric that welcomes me in a more open way… Austria and Germany have 
a culture that is similar to mine [he comes from North-East Italy] … or Switzerland 
perhaps, we’ll see”.  
 
 The final option – “wait and see” – was motivated by the lack of reliable information 
on the consequences of Brexit for EU citizens. It is true that, as the deadline approached in 
December 2017 for the conclusion of the first round of EU-UK negotiations on the terms of 
Brexit, some clarity has emerged, with a more positive outlook for EU migrants in Britain 
wanting to stay. But at the time the post-Brexit interviewees were carried out, there was huge 
uncertainty. Hence, the respondents who picked this default option were wanting to wait for 
clarity on the legal, political and economic effects of the Brexit process. At the same time, 
nearly all of these “wait and see” participants intended to return to Italy in the future, even if 
the time-frame was rarely specified beyond “one day”. The main obstacle to a more concrete 
return plan was the precarious Italian job market. In the words of Nicoletta (31), who is for the 
time being settled in Brighton with her Italian husband and their one-year-old son: 
 
 “The idea is not to stay here forever… I would like to go back to Italy, but if we don’t 
find any jobs in Italy, we will be forced to stay here… and this whole situation makes 
me anxious”. 
 
Nicoletta’s anxiety is reflective of the extraordinary delay in achieving clarity with 
regard to immigration controls, the rights of EU citizens to stay, and future movement into 
Britain; issues which are closely linked to ongoing and as yet unresolved negotiations over free 
trade and membership of the (or “a”) customs union. Hence it is unrealistic to expect clear and 
consistent answers to our third research question about changed plans for future mobility. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION. – This article is one of the first (following Lulle et al., 2018) 
to investigate the reactions of a group of EU immigrants living in the UK to the realities of 
Brexit, based on analysis of in-depth qualitative interviews to a strategically selected but 
statistically non-probabilistic sample of young Italians. 
 To summarise, the results of our interview surveys show that young Italian migrants 
initially reacted with shock at the surprise outcome of the Brexit referendum. Fairly soon, the 
shock grave way to longer-lasting emotions, such as anger, a sense of betrayal and feelings of 
victimhood. In a third stage, the participants articulated rhetorical strategies to deal with their 
new situation as apparently unwanted EU immigrants, aggregated together with the large influx 
of post-2004 migrants from the new accession countries. The main strategies were twofold. 
The first consisted in a rhetoric of justifying their worth and “right to be here” in terms of their 
contribution to the British economy and society – a kind of “tactics of belonging” (Lulle et al., 
2018; Moroșanu and Fox, 2013). The second discursive strategy has been to deflect the stigma 
and guilt of being an immigrant somehow “responsible” for the Brexit result on to someone 
else. A new social boundary (Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Wimmer, 2008) between A and B 
class immigrants was drawn to re-assert Italians’ (and other “old” member-state migrants’) 
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status in British society as “legitimate” and “deserved”, as distinct from the “real targets” of 
the hostile political climate towards immigrants – Eastern Europeans and asylum-seekers. 
 Regarding participants’ ideal plans for the future, the option were basically threefold: 
returning to Italy; moving on to a different European country; or staying put, either with a view 
to settling long-term, or simply biding their time to wait and see how the rights of EU citizens 
would be dealt with in the drawn-out negotiations between the UK government and the EU’s 
representatives. At the time when the re-interviews and the new post-Brexit interviews were 
carried out (late 2016 and early 2017), the situation was unclear since the bilateral negotiations 
were stalled over three fundamental issues – the residual budget contributions to be paid by the 
UK (the so-called “divorce bill”), the issue of the Irish border between the Republic and 
Northern Ireland, and the rights of EU citizens to stay and enter in the future. Because of this 
ongoing lack of clarity (only in December 2017 was significant progress made), the “wait and 
see” strategy was widespread (13). The other main finding under this heading was that, in 
comparison to the pre-Brexit interview round, the attitudes and plans of the participants had 
not really changed. If anything, Brexit had merely given them an extra incentive to think much 
more concretely about moving back to Italy or onwards to somewhere else. 
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SUMMARY: The aim of this article is to describe the reactions of young Italian 
migrants in Britain to “Brexit”, the 2016 referendum decision for the UK to leave the European 
Union. Brexit is seen as an historical moment of “rupture” which is not only reorienting 
Britain’s relationship with Europe and the world but is also deeply affecting the lives of its 3.2 
million migrants from the EU. The empirical material comes from 35 in-depth interviews with 
young Italian migrants living and either studying or working in the London region: 20 
interviews carried out pre-referendum and 15 post-Brexit. The analysis documents their 
immediate reactions and interpretations of the result (surprise, shock, anger, a sense of betrayal), 
their coping strategies (stressing their “rights to belong” and drawing a social boundary 
between themselves and “other”, i.e. East European migrants), and their plans for the future. 
On this last question, Brexit has not fundamentally changed their ultimate plans to return home 
“one day”, but in some cases it has accelerated this decision, as well as making them think 
about moving to another European country.  
 
RIASSUNTO: Lo scopo di questo articolo è di descrivere le reazioni di giovani 
migranti Italiani residenti in Gran Bretagna rispetto alla “Brexit”, il Referendum del 2016 che 
ha stabilito l’uscita del Regno Unito dall’Unione Europea. La Brexit è vista come un momento 
storico di “rottura”, che non solo sta riorientando le relazioni tra Regno Unito ed Europa (e il 
resto del mondo), ma sta anche influenzando profondamente la vita dei suoi 3,2 milioni di 
immigrati europei. L’articolo si basa su 35 interviste in profondità con giovani migranti italiani 
che vivono nell’area di Londra per studio o lavoro: 20 interviste sono state condotte prima e 
15 dopo il Referendum. L’analisi riporta le loro reazioni spontanee e le interpretazioni date al 
voto (sorpresa, shock, rabbia, tradimento), le loro “strategie di sopravvivenza”. Esse sono, da 
un lato, volte a sottolineare il loro diritto di “appartenenza” al contesto di residenza mentre, 
dall’altro, tracciano un confine tra loro stessi ed “altre” categorie di migranti, in primis quelli 
provenienti dall’Est Europa. Un terzo focus dell’articolo sono i piani per il futuro dei 
partecipanti. Riguardo quest’ultimo punto, la Brexit essenzialmente non ha cambiato i loro 
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piani di tornare a casa “in futuro”, anche se in certi casi ha accelerato questa decisione o ha 
costituito un incentivo per spingerli a trasferirsi in un altro stato europeo. 
 
RÉSUMÉ: Cet article a pour objectif de décrire les réactions de jeunes immigrés italiens 
en Grande Bretagne vis-à-vis « Brexit » – la décision résultant du référendum de 2016 selon 
laquelle le Royaume Uni quittera l’Union Européenne. Brexit est perçu comme un moment 
historique de « rupture » non seulement réorientant les relations de la Grande Bretagne avec 
l’Europe et le monde mais aussi affectant très profondément les vies de ses 3.2 millions 
d’immigrés de l’Union Européenne. Le matériel empirique résulte de 35 entretiens en 
profondeur avec de jeunes immigrés italiens résidant et travaillant ou étudiant dans la région 
de Londres : 20 entretiens d’avant le référendum et 15 post-Brexit. L’analyse documente les 
réactions immédiates de ces jeunes et leurs interprétations du résultat (surprise, choc, colère, 
un sentiment de trahison), leurs stratégies d’adaptation (soulignant leur « droit d’appartenir » 
et démarquant les limites sociales entre eux-mêmes et les « autres », c’est-à-dire des immigrés 
de l’Europe de l’Est), et leurs projets d’avenir. En ce qui concerne cette dernière question, 
Brexit n’a pas fondamentalement modifié leurs projets ultimes de retourner « un jour » chez 
eux, mais dans certains cas il a accéléré cette décision, leur obligeant également à songer aller 
vivre dans un autre pays européen. 
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